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ABSTRACT
Context: Today’s safety critical systems are increasingly
reliant on software. Software becomes responsible for most
of the critical functions of systems. Many different safety
analysis techniques have been developed to identify hazards
of systems. FTA and FMEA are most commonly used by
safety analysts. Recently, STPA has been proposed with
the goal to better cope with complex systems including soft-
ware. Objective: This research aimed at comparing quan-
titatively these three safety analysis techniques with regard
to their effectiveness, applicability, understandability, ease
of use and efficiency in identifying software safety require-
ments at the system level. Method: We conducted a con-
trolled experiment with 21 master and bachelor students
applying these three techniques to three safety-critical sys-
tems: train door control, anti-lock braking and traffic colli-
sion and avoidance. Results: The results showed that there
is no statistically significant difference between these tech-
niques in terms of applicability, understandability and ease
of use, but a significant difference in terms of effectiveness
and efficiency is obtained. Conclusion: We conclude that
STPA seems to be an effective method to identify software
safety requirements at the system level. In particular, STPA
addresses more different software safety requirements than
the traditional techniques FTA and FMEA, but STPA needs
more time to carry out by safety analysts with little or no
prior experience.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
G.3 [Probability and Statistics/Experimental Design]:
Controlled Experiments
General Terms
Measurement, Experimentation
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1. INTRODUCTION
At present, software is an integrated and complex part
of many modern safety-critical systems and the amount of
software is increasing. Thus, software safety must be consid-
ered to ensure system safety. Software can create hazards
through erroneous control of the system or by misleading
the system operators into taking inappropriate actions [7].
Many accidents and losses have been caused by software, for
example the loss of Ariane 5 [12], Therac-25 [8] and more re-
cently the Toyota Prius. There exist over 100 safety analysis
techniques which are used in industry [1]. Safety analysts,
however, apply only few of them regularly. Recently, safety
engineering literature contains more and more claims that
the traditional safety analysis techniques are not adequate
for analysing the current complex and fast-evolving systems
[6, 7]
Among traditional safety analysis techniques, FMEA (Fail-
ure Modes and Effects Analysis) and FTA (Fault Tree Anal-
ysis) are the most common techniques used in system safety
and reliability engineering. They have been used at the com-
ponent level but are less effective for factors that involve in-
teractions between components, software flaws and external
noise [7]. Indeed, major accidents in large complex systems
are not caused by the failure of technical components, but
rather software failures and organizational factors influence
the design, manufacturing and operation of the system [7].
A new trend is to advance the safety analysis techniques
by system and control theory rather than reliability theory.
STPA (Systems-Theoretic Processes Analysis) has been de-
veloped by Leveson since 2004 as a safety analysis approach
based on STAMP (System-Theoretic Accident Model and
Processes) for identifying system hazards and safety-related
constraints necessary to ensure acceptable risk.
1.1 Problem Statement
There exists a plethora of safety analysis techniques which
are currently used to identify the system safety requirements
such as FTA, FMEA and more recently STPA. FMEA and
FTA are widely used in industry for identifying hazards in
safety-critical systems. STPA has been developed to iden-
tify hazards in today’s complex systems and to overcome
the limitations of applying the traditional safety analysis
techniques on these complex systems. Since STPA is a rela-
tively new technique, we have no clear understanding of its
capabilities and difficulties compared to the existing safety
analysis techniques in terms of extracting software safety re-
quirements on the system level.
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1.2 Research Objectives
Our overall objective is to better understand different
safety analysis techniques to aid safety engineers in prac-
tices. This study aims at exploring the application of three
safety analysis techniques to get a full understanding about
their capabilities in terms of identifying the software safety
requirements of software-intensive systems at the system
level.
1.3 Contribution
The contribution presented in this paper is a quantita-
tive comparison of the application of STPA vs. FTA, STPA
vs. FMEA and FTA vs. FMEA in gathering software safety
requirements at the system level of three safety-critical sys-
tems: train door control, traffic collision avoidance and anti-
lock braking. We made the comparison in a controlled ex-
periment with 21 undergraduate and graduate students.
1.4 Context
The controlled experiment was conducted during the win-
ter semester 2014/15 with master students from the interna-
tional master programme (INFOTECH), who are studying
in three different specializations: embedded systems engi-
neering, computer hardware and software engineering and
communication engineering, and bachelor students who are
in their last year, studying in different departments: aerospace
engineering, mechanical engineering and software engineer-
ing at the University of Stuttgart, Germany.
2. BACKGROUND
In this section, we describe the three safety analysis tech-
niques investigated in the experiment: FTA, FMEA and
STPA.
2.1 Fault Tree Analysis
FTA [21] was developed at Bell Laboratories in the early
1960’s under a U.S. Air Force contract to analyse the Min-
uteman missile system. FTA is a top-down approach to iden-
tify critical failure combinations. It is based on the chain of
event accidents model. It is widely used to discover design
defects during the development of a system and to investi-
gate the causes of accidents or problems that occur during
system operations [13, 9, 11]. The input of FTA is a known
hazard, failure or accident, and a design description of the
system under analysis. The FTA process can be divided
into four main steps: 1) identify the root node (hazard or
accident or failure); 2) identify the combination of events or
conditions that caused the root node and combine them by
using Boolean logic operators; 3) decompose the sub-nodes
until events determined are basic (leaf nodes); and 4) iden-
tify minimum cut sets which are the smallest sets of basic
events that cause the root node to occur.
2.2 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
FMEA [20] was developed by NASA in 1971 and adopted
by the U.S. military in 1974 as a systematic, proactive method
for evaluating and discovering the potential failures, their
potential cause mechanisms and the risks designed into a
product or a process. FMEA helps to identify where and
how the component might fail and to assess the relative im-
pact of different failures. FMEA is, similar to FTA, based
on the chain of events accidents model. FMEA is a bottom-
up, structured, table-based process for discovering and doc-
umenting the ways in which a component can fail and the
consequences of those failures. The input to FMEA is a de-
sign description of the system and component. The FMEA
process can be divided into four sub-tasks: 1) establish the
scope of the analysis, 2) identify the failure modes of each
block; 3) determine the effect of each potential failure mode
and its potential causes; and 4) evaluate each failure mode in
terms of the worst potential consequences and assign the rel-
ative values for the assumed severity, occurrence and chance
of detection to calculate the risk priority number. Ulti-
mately, the analyst has to develop the recommended action
required to reduce the risk associated with potential causes
of a failure mode [13].
2.3 Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis
STPA (Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis) [10] is a safety
analysis technique which is based on a Systems-Theoretic
Accident Model and Process (STAMP) of accidents for large
and complex systems. STPA has been developed to identify
more thoroughly the causal factors in complex safety-critical
systems including software design errors. With STPA, the
system is viewed as interacting control loops and the acci-
dents are considered as results from inadequate enforcement
of safety constraints in the design, development and opera-
tion.
STPA aims to create a set of scenarios that can lead to an
accident. It is similar to FTA but STPA includes a broader
set of potential scenarios including those in which no failures
occur but the problems arise due to unsafe and unintended
interactions among the system components [7]. STPA pro-
vides guidance and a systematic process to identify the po-
tential for inadequate control of the system that could lead
to a hazardous state which results from inadequate control
or enforcement of the safety constraints. STPA is imple-
mented in the three steps: 1) Establish the fundamentals of
STPA before beginning the analysis by identifying system
accidents or unacceptable loss events and draw the prelim-
inary control structure diagram of the system; 2) identify
the potentially unsafe control actions that could lead to a
hazardous state; and 3) determine how each potentially haz-
ardous control action could occur. Recently, STPA has been
applied in different areas in industry (e.g. Space Shuttle Op-
erations [16] and Interval Management in NextGen [2]).
3. RELATEDWORK
There exist a number of empirical studies which have been
performed to compare safety analysis techniques
Jung et al. [4] conducted a controlled experiment and its
replication to compare two safety analysis methods: Com-
ponent Integrated Fault Trees (CFT) and Fault Tree (FT)
with regard to the capabilities of the safety analysis meth-
ods (such as quality and the results) and to the participants’
rating of the consistency, clarity and maintainability of these
methods. The experiment was carried out with seven aca-
demic staff members working towards their PhD and then
replicated with eleven domain experts from industry. The
result showed that the CFT has potential of being benefi-
cial for employees with little or no experience in fault tree
analysis. CFT can be beneficial for companies looking for
a safety analysis approach for a project using model-based
development.
Mouaffo et al. [14] conducted two controlled experiments
to compare fault-tree based safety analysis techniques: State
Event Fault Tree analysis (SEFT) vs. Dynamic Fault Tree
(DFT) and SEFT vs. Fault Tree combined with Markov
Chains Analysis (MC). The two controlled experiments were
conducted as a part of two lectures with students and re-
searchers as participants. The first experiment (SEFT vs.
DFT) was run with eight students and six researchers (14
subjects). The second experiment (SEFT vs. FT+MC) was
conducted with twenty-seven students. The results showed
that the subjects found DFT more applicable than SEFT
and SEFT more applicable than FT+MC. Also, the sub-
jects needed less time to perform DFT or FT+MC than to
perform SEFT.
Leveson et al. [6] compared STPA and the Aerospace
Recommended Practice (ARP 4761) in a case study. The
safety assessment process in ARP 4761 contains different
safety analysis techniques such as Functional hazard analysis
(FHA), Preliminary System Safety Analysis (PSSA), System
Safety Analysis (SSA), FTA, FMEA and Common Cause
Analysis (CCA). They compared the traditional safety anal-
ysis techniques which are recommended in ARP 4761 with
STPA using the aircraft wheel brake system example. In
particular, they compared FHA, PSSA, and SSA with STPA.
The criteria of comparison between both methods were: un-
derlying accident causality model, goals, results, role of hu-
mans in the analysis, role of software in the analysis. The
results of their analysis of using both techniques on the same
system showed that STPA identifies hazards omitted by the
ARP 4761 process, particularly those associated with soft-
ware, human factors and operations.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no controlled ex-
periment comparing the effectiveness, efficiency and appli-
cability of FTA, FMEA and STPA in terms of identifying
the software safety requirements at the system level. We
have not found any experiment evaluating FTA vs. FMEA
or both vs. STPA.
4. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
In the following, we specify the goal of the experiment,
describe the experimental design used for the experiment
and the procedure followed for its execution.
4.1 Study Goal
In this study, we analyse the application of FTA, FMEA
and STPA to safety-critical software to explore which tech-
nique is more effective, efficient, applicable, easier to use and
understandable in the terms of identifying software safety
requirements at the system level.
4.2 Experiment Variables
4.2.1 Independent Variables
There are two independent variables in our experiment:
safety analysis technique and safety-critical system.
4.2.2 Dependent Variables
Our experimental design consist of five dependent vari-
ables which are: applicability, understandability, ease of use,
effectiveness and efficiency of the safety analysis techniques
in identifying software safety requirements in the context of
the whole system. Applicability is the measure of the de-
gree to which the participants can apply the given safety
analysis technique to software at the system level. Under-
standability measures the degree to which the participants
understand the procedures and notations of the given tech-
nique. Ease of use measures the degree to which the partic-
ipants find the application of the given technique to software
easy. Effectiveness measures how many different software
safety requirements identified by using one technique. Effi-
ciency measures the amount of time needed by participants
when they use each safety analysis technique to identify soft-
ware safety requirements.
4.3 Research Questions
To investigate the application of FTA, FMEA and STPA,
the following research questions are addressed:
RQ1: Which safety analysis technique is more ap-
plicable to identify software safety requirements at
the system level? RQ1 is relevant to investigate since the
subject of FTA, FMEA, and STPA is the system, not soft-
ware. Moreover, STPA was developed based on a system-
theoretic accident model to overcome the lacking in ability
of FTA and FMEA to address software and sub-systems in-
teractions safety requirements.
RQ2: Which notations and procedures of the safety
analysis techniques are more understandable? Easily
understood notations and procedures of any safety analysis
technique enable safety analysts to identify safety require-
ments easily. FTA, FMEA and STPA have specific proce-
dures and notations that can be used to identify and doc-
ument safety requirements, therefore, the understandability
of their notations and procedures is important to investi-
gate.
RQ3: How difficult is it to use each safety analysis
technique to identify software safety requirements?
This question is important to investigate since the successful
adoption of any technique is dependent on how easy it is to
use. The three techniques rely on different structures. The
main structure of FTA is a fault tree, FMEA is a table and
STPA is control structure diagram and tables.
RQ4: How effective are the safety analysis tech-
niques in identifying software safety requirements?
Each technique has strengths and limitations to address dif-
ferent safety requirements. In particular, traditional meth-
ods FTA and FMEA consider safety as component problem
(e.g. component failure), whereas STPA considers safety as
a system’s control problem (e.g. hardware failure, software
error, interactions between components failure) rather than
a component failure problem. Therefore, we want to inves-
tigate their effectiveness in the terms of addressing software
safety requirements.
RQ5: How efficient are the safety analysis tech-
niques in identifying software safety requirements?
Since FTA, FMEA and STPA provide different procedures
and notations, therefore, different amount of time will be
needed to perform safety analysis task by analysts. There-
fore, we want to measure the amount of time needed for
performing safety analysis tasks by using each technique.
4.4 Hypotheses
The research questions RQ1−RQ3 were to investigate which
safety analysis technique is more applicable, understandable
and easy to use than others in identifying software safety
requirements at the system level. The hypotheses H1, H2
and H3 of the three dependent variables Applicability (A),
Understandability (U) and Ease of use (E) were formulated
respectively as follows: Null hypothesis Hn1,2,3j : There
is no difference in the applicability, understandability and
ease of use between safety analysis techniques to identify
software safety requirements.
Hn11: µSTPAA=µFTAA, Hn12: µSTPAA=µFMEAA,
Hn13: µFMEAA=µFTAA
Hn21: µSTPAU=µFTAU , Hn22: µSTPAU=µFMEAU ,
Hn23: µFMEAU=µFTAU
Hn31: µSTPAE=µFTAE , Hn32: µSTPAE=µFMEAE ,
Hn33: µFMEAE=µFTAE
Alternative hypothesis Ha1,2,3j : The participants will
perceive the applicability, understandability and ease of use
of safety analysis techniques differently.
Ha11: µSTPAA>µFTAA, Ha12: µSTPAA>µFMEAA,
Ha13: µFMEAA>µFTAA
Ha21: µSTPAU>µFTAU , Ha22: µSTPAU>µFMEAU ,
Ha23: µFMEAU>µFTAU
Ha31: µSTPAE>µFTAE , Ha32: µSTPAE>µFMEAE ,
Ha33: µFMEAE>µFTAE
The research questions (RQ4) and (RQ5) were to investigate
which technique is more effective and efficient in identifying
the software safety requirements. The hypotheses H4 and
H5 of the dependent variables: Effectiveness (F) and Effi-
ciency (C) were formulated respectively as follows:
Null hypothesis Hn4,5j : There is no difference in the ef-
fectiveness and efficiency between the three safety analysis
techniques.
Hn41: µSTPAF=µFTAF , Hn42: µSTPAF=µFMEAF ,
Hn43: µFMEAF=µFTAF
Hn51: µSTPAC=µFTAC , Hn52: µSTPAC=µFMEAC ,
Hn53: µFMEAC=µFTAC
Alternative hypothesis Ha4,5j : STPA is more effective
and efficient than FMEA and FTA, and FMEA is more ef-
fective and efficient than FTA.
Ha41: µSTPAF>µFTAF , Ha42: µSTPAF>µFMEAF ,
Ha43: µFMEAF>µFTAF
Ha51: µSTPAC>µFTAC , Ha52: µSTPAC>µFMEAC ,
Ha53: µFMEAC>µFTAC
4.5 Study Objects
We used software controllers of three systems as study ob-
jects: Train Door Control System (TDCS), Anti-Lock Brak-
ing System (ABS) and Traffic Collision and Avoidance Sys-
tem (TCAS).
4.5.1 Train Door Control System (TDCS)
The train door control system [19, 18] was designed to
open and close a door of train and monitors the status of
the door. The main components of train door systems are:
1) door controller; 2) door actuator; 3) physical door; 4) and
door sensor. Controller software in the door control unit
continuously monitors all other components. The mecha-
nism of the train door controller is that the sensor sends a
signal about the door position and the status of the door to
the door controller. Then, the door controller receives input
from the door sensor with some other inputs from external
sensors about the position of the train. The controller also
gets an indication about possible emergencies from an ex-
ternal sensor. Then, the controller issues the door open or
close commands. The actuator will receive these commands
and apply mechanical force on the physical door.
4.5.2 Anti-Lock Braking System (ABS)
ABS [3] is an active safety feature designed to aid a car
driver by preventing the wheels from completely locking dur-
ing an emergency stop. ABS applies the optimum braking
pressure to the individual wheels that ensure the vehicle can
still be steered and shorten braking distances on slippery
surfaces. ABS retains steering control and avoids skidding
during an episode of heavy braking. It monitors the speed
of each wheel to detect locking.
The three main components of ABS are: 1) Wheel speed
sensors that monitor wheel rotation speed; 2) hydraulic units
that pump the brakes, and; 3) an electronic control unit
(ECU) which receives information from the wheel speed sen-
sors and, if necessary, directs the hydraulic units to pump
the brakes on one or more of the wheels.
4.5.3 Traffic Collision and Avoidance System (TCAS)
TCAS [5] is the system responsible for giving warning
to pilots about the presence of another aircraft that may
present a threat of collision. TCAS relies on a combination
of surveillance sensors to collect data on the state of the in-
truder aircraft and a set of algorithms that determine the
best maneuver that the pilot should make to avoid a mid-
air collision. The main components of TCAS are: 1) TCAS
computer unit processor; 2) antennas on aircraft body; and
3) TCAS presentation. The TCAS antenna continually sur-
veys the airspace around an aircraft and transmits a signal.
TCAS continuously calculates the tracked aircraft position
and updates and displays the real-time position information
on a display.
4.6 Participants
We conducted the experiment with a total of 21 partic-
ipants; 16 of them were master students from the inter-
national master’s program in Information Technology (IN-
FOTECH) with different specializations (e.g. embedded sys-
tems engineering, computer hardware and software engineer-
ing and communication engineering and media technology).
Five of them were bachelor students from aerospace engi-
neering, software engineering and mechanical engineering.
We selected only the students who had a background and
experience working with software in embedded systems. The
participants were randomly assigned into three groups A, B
and C. Each group has an equal number of participants (7
students).
4.7 Experiment Instruments
We give each group detailed guidelines which present the
procedure of each technique with step-by-step instructions.
We also give the participants the functional and design doc-
umentation for each study object before conducting the ex-
periment. We provide the participants paper-based tem-
plates to document their results and time instead of using
documentation applications (e.g. Word, Excel) or tool sup-
port for three techniques to avoid the influence of usability
and ease or difficulty of the tools.
4.8 Data Collection Procedure
There are three different data sources that we use in this
research:
4.8.1 Questionnaires
We developed questionnaires to help in gathering data
from the participants. The questions were newly devel-
oped for testing the understanding, applicability, ease of
use, and the effectiveness of each safety analysis technique
to identify the software safety requirements for software-
intensive systems at the system level. We divided the ques-
tionnaires into two categories: pre-experiment questionnaire
and post-experiment questionnaire. We developed the pre-
experiment questionnaire to capture information about the
participants and their backgrounds. We developed the post-
experiment questionnaire to gather the data after conduct-
ing each experiment. The post-experiment questionnaire in-
cludes 12 closed questions about how they worked with each
safety analysis technique and what are their subjective as-
sessments of each technique. The questionnaires sheets were
distributed to participants during the experiment tasks.
4.8.2 The final reports of safety analysis
The participants should report during their work the ac-
tivities and the software safety requirements which are de-
rived by using the given technique. We developed paper-
based template to help the participants to document the
software safety requirements at the end of their work.
4.8.3 Time sheets
Time sheets are a paper-based template for time tracking
the participants use to record their amount of time spent
during the case study work. The participants have to write
down the starting and ending times for each task they per-
formed.
4.9 Measurements
We use a 5-point Likert scale: ”Strongly disagree”, ”Dis-
agree”, ”Neither agree nor disagree”, ”Agree” and ”Strongly
Agree” as the response format of questionnaire items for rat-
ing most of questionnaire items which are relevant to the
research questions RQ1, RQ2 and RQ3. For collecting data
for research question RQ4, we use the final reports of the
safety analysis techniques. The effectiveness of each tech-
nique can be computed with two measures: 1) the number of
how many software safety requirements were found (recall);
and 2) the number of how many different types of software
safety requirements were found (coverage). To measure the
coverage of each technique, we classify the software safety
requirements into different types (e.g. missing input, wrong
output or missing feedback) based on the classification of
common software hazards discussed in the book NASA soft-
ware safety [15] and the common control flaws classification
scheme introduced by Leveson in her book Engineering a
Safer World [7]. To collect data for the question RQ5, we
use the time tracking sheets to calculate the time needed by
participants to perform each task in minutes.
4.10 Experiment Design
For designing the controlled experiment, we used a bal-
anced factorial design with two factors of interest with three
levels (three safety analysis techniques and three safety-
critical systems). The factorial experiment consists of nine
experimental units. Table 1 shows the balanced 3x3 two-
factor factorial design matrix. We have a balanced design
in which each group has the same number of participants.
Each group has to work only one task adopting only one
technique and one study object to reduce the influence of
learning effects about the study objects or use the same tech-
nique in the experiment. Moreover, each group worked in
the separated room to provide a good workplace for each
group to avoid negative influence between the groups dur-
ing the discussion. We chose to conduct the experiment as
a blind experiment in which our participants have no idea
about the hypotheses and the research questions to compare
the results of the participants in each controlled experiment
task.
The experiment was divided into three tasks and each
task was conducted with all participants divided into three
groups A, B and C (shown in Table 1): Task 1: The train
door control system was the study object of this task. The
level of complexity of this task was low; Task 2: The ABS
system was used for the second task. The level of complexity
of this task was medium; and Task 3: The traffic collision
and avoidance system was the study object of this task. The
level of complexity of this task was high.
Table 1: Experimental Design
Safety Analysis Techniques
Tasks Study Objects FTA FMEA STPA
Task 1 TDCS C B A
Task 2 ABS B A C
Task 3 TCAS A C B
4.11 Pilot Study
After preparing the experimental design, we conducted a
pilot study with 3 participants (1 student who is a developer
of tool support for STPA and 2 Ph.D. students) from the
research group Software Engineering, Institute of Software
Technology, University of Stuttgart. The participants had a
good background in software-critical systems and the STPA
safety analysis technique. The pilot study allowed us to test
our experimental design, to cover the potential problems, to
confirm the selections of participants and the tasks, and to
estimate the required time of the actual experiment. The pi-
lot study was performed by following the same procedure of
the experimental design. Since we had only 3 participants,
we conducted the experiment with them as one group. Af-
ter conducting the pilot study and gathering all necessary
information, we tested the data analysis procedure to ensure
that we can answer the research questions. In the following,
we present learned lessons from analysing the pilot study.
The participants of the pilot study suggested the following
improvements to our experiment design: 1) the presentation
slides and tutorial guidelines should contain information on
how to perform each task and what are the roles of each per-
son; 2) we should organise a lecture on safety engineering for
software-intensive systems before conducting the experiment
to motivate the participants, increase their knowledge about
software safety and introduce the terminology of safety en-
gineering which are contained in the experiment; 3) the time
for training and experiment for each group should be more
than one hour and a half for each task; and 4) the instruc-
tions for the procedure for performing the safety analysis
should be enhanced by including a concrete and complete
example of safety analysis for each technique.
Based on these suggestions from the participants in the
pilot study, we improved our experimental design. The
presentation slides were improved by explaining how the
participants should work each task and what the role of
each person. Each team has to select a moderator of the
safety analysis team who will manage the team and se-
lect the person who is responsible for merging the results
from each person, writing down the results of each step,
and writing the common list of safety requirements at the
end of the task (notary). The time of each training and ex-
periment task work was fixed on average 4 hours per task
(3 groups × 3 techniques × 4 hour = 36 hours) for the ex-
periment.
4.12 Study Preparation
We invited each group to a lecture on safety engineering
for software-intensive systems which lasted 1 hour (3 groups×
1 hour = 3 hours). The lecture included an introduction
about safety engineering, safety analysis techniques, what
system safety and software safety are, how the software
can contribute to accidents, what is different between soft-
ware/system engineering and safety engineering and expla-
nations about the safety engineering terminology such as
hazard, accidents and undesired event (top event). At the
beginning of the lecture with each group, we asked the par-
ticipants to fill out the pre-experiment questionnaire to gather
information about their background and pervious experi-
ence. At the end of the lecture, we asked the participants
to choose the date and timeslot of training and experiment
work. Each group had to select three timeslots during two
weeks in the period 27th October 2014 to 10th November
2014. We had three exercise slots for the safety engineering
lecture and nine exercise timeslots to conduct the experi-
ment with the three groups.
Before conducting the experiment tasks work, we con-
ducted an extensive preparation procedure with tutorials to
ensure that our participants have a minimal level of knowl-
edge regarding to the study objects and the application of
the three safety analysis techniques. Each group received
three training sessions on how to use these three safety anal-
ysis techniques: FTA, FMEA and STPA to identify the soft-
ware safety requirements in the software-intensive systems.
Furthermore, the participants were introduced to the theo-
retical part of each safety analysis technique and how to use
the safety analysis technique to reduce the amount of risk
of software to an acceptable level. We presented them dur-
ing the training program a short video for each study object
which explained the mechanism of the study object.
The training procedure lasted 2 hours per group/technique
(3 groups×3 techniques×2 hours = 18 hours) for the three
techniques. We divided the preparation time into two parts
per technique: a half hour for introducing the theoretical
part and one and a half hour for the practical exercises on
using the safety analysis technique.
4.13 Execution Procedure
After each training session, we ran each sub-task work
of the three experiment tasks with a fixed time of 2 hours
per sub-task work (3 groups × 3 techniques × 2 hours = 18
hours) for the three tasks. At the beginning of each task,
we explained the duties of the group, the study object, the
safety analysis technique and the fixed time slot. We also
provided the experiment task materials e.g. instructions of
the given safety analysis technique, a detailed tutorial of the
technique, which includes a detailed description of the study
object and a practical example of safety analysis conducted
using the given technique, the paper-based template and a
time tracking sheet. Next, we asked the group participants
to select a moderator and notary from them to manage the
task session and record the final reports of the group. Then,
we let the group work on the assigned sub-task. At the end
of each sub-task, the team had to discuss and compare their
individual software safety requirements to develop a com-
mon list of software safety requirements. Then the notary
of the group had to fill in the paper-based template and all
group participants had to answer a post-experiment ques-
tionnaire.
4.14 Data Analysis Procedure
For analysing the collected data and testing hypotheses,
we used the following data analysis procedure: Reliability
Testing : We calculate the Cronbach’s Alpha to measure the
reliability of the Likert-type scale
Descriptive Statistics: We present the collected data with
appropriate descriptive statistics to get a better understand-
ing of the data. To answer RQ1–3, we first calculate the
measures for central tendency of ordinal data of each ques-
tion in post-experiment questionnaire mode, median and
median absolute deviations (MAD) for its dispersion. Next,
we compute the median for the related questions group of
each dependent variable to perform descriptive statistics for
each dependent variable. Then, we calculate the median of
median, mode and MAD for the new values of the three
variables. To answer RQ 4, we investigate the final report
of each experiment and calculate the number of software
safety requirements which are reported by the participants
and we map them into different categories. Then, we calcu-
late the recall and the coverage of each technique. They can
be measured based on the following equations:
Recall (x) =
|Number of SSRsX |
|Total of SSRsALL| (1)
Coverage (x) =
|Number of SSRTsX |
|Total of SSRTsALL| (2)
Where x acts the safety analysis approach, and SSRsX is
the number of the software safety requirements that are re-
ported during a safety analysis. SSRsALL is the total num-
ber of safety requirements that are reported by all safety
analysis approaches. SSRTsX is the number of different
types of software safety requirements that are reported by
using a safety analysis approach and SSRTsALL is the total
number of different software safety requirements categories
that are addressed by all techniques.
To answer RQ5, we calculate the time needed by partici-
pants to perform each task in minutes.
Hypothesis Testing : We use the Two-Way Analysis Of
Variance (ANOVA) with Post-Hoc analysis for testing our
hypotheses. We test the hypotheses at a confidence level of
0.05.
5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We summarise the study population by analysing the per-
experiment questionnaire answers. The participants repre-
sent a broad range of the system engineering domain. 38% of
participants study master of embedded systems engineering,
24% computer hardware and software engineering, 14% com-
munication engineering and 14% study bachelor of mechan-
ical engineering, 5% software engineering and 5% aerospace
Table 2: Descriptive of Self-Assessed Participants’ Background and Experience
Descriptive Results
Self-Assessment on 5-point Likert scale Mode Median MAD Min Max
Background in embedded systems software 3 3 0 1 4
Experience in embedded systems software 3 3 1 1 4
Background in safety analysis 2 3 1 2 4
Experience in safety analysis 2 2 1 2 3
Table 3: Cronbach’s Alpha of the Post-Experiment Questionnaire
Dependent Variables Applicatbility Understandability Ease of use
Technique FTA FMEA STPA FTA FMEA STPA FTA FMEA STPA
Cronbach’s measure 0.72 0.72 0.79 0.79 0.30 0.71 0.74 0.77 0.87
engineering. Five of the respondents have a background in
safety analysis, and they have prior knowledge on FTA (3
respondents) and FMEA (2 respondents) from their stud-
ies. Only one of the participants has a prior experience with
both safety analysis techniques FTA and FMEA. Moreover,
the participants rated their background and experience on
an ordinal scales (1= very poor to 5= very good). The
results are shown in Table 2. Overall, the participants re-
ported a medium level of background and experience in the
embedded systems software and low experience with safety
analysis. The deviation in the participants’ answers about
their self-assessment in all responses was 1 or lower. Hence,
we had a homogeneous group.
5.1 Descriptive Statistics1
We first calculated the reliability of the post-experiment
questionnaire using the Cronbach’s α reliability measure which
is a common measure of internal consistency. Theoretically,
a higher value of Cronbach’s α is better (e.g. a value of 0.70
and above for the Cronbach’s α is sufficient for internal con-
sistency) [17]. Table 3 shows the reliability statistics mea-
sure for the dependent variables. All dependent variables for
the three techniques demonstrated high reliability and inter-
nal consistency, ranging from 0.71 to 0.87 and they exceeded
0.70, except for understandability regarding FMEA. It was
0.30 which indicates a fairly good internal consistency.
Next, we calculated descriptive statistics for each question
in the post-experiment questionnaire (shown in Table 4). In
the following, we discuss in detail the results of the related
questions of each dependent variable.
5.1.1 Applicability (RQ1)
Regarding the questionnaire, we asked the participants
three questions Q1–Q3 about their opinions on the applica-
bility of each technique. Q1 was on how the participants
found the given safety analysis technique is applicable to
identify relevant software safety requirements. The results
of Q1 (Table 4) show that STPA received the highest num-
ber of Strongly Agree, whereas FMEA and FTA received a
moderate agreement. The deviation in the answers of this
question was low with a MAD between 0 and 1. Q2 was
1The questionnaires, the collected data and the analysis
results are available on http://dx.doi.org/10.6084/m9.
figshare.1275190
about whether participants were able to identify the rele-
vant software safety requirements by using the given tech-
nique. The results of Q2 denote that STPA and FTA have
received a moderate agreement, whilst FMEA has received
a neutral agreement. For all responses to Q2, the deviation
was low (MAD: 1). Q3 was about whether the given tech-
nique provides a systematic way to identify software safety
requirements. For Q3, the respondents agreed moderately
with FTA, FMEA and STPA. The deviation was again be-
tween 1 and 0.
5.1.2 Understandability (RQ2)
We asked the participants four questions Q4–Q7 to col-
lect their opinions about the understandability of each tech-
nique. Q4 was on whether the participants found the pro-
cedure of a given technique easy to understand. For Q4
(Table 4), on average, we see a moderate agreement for
the three procedures. The deviation here was low with a
MAD between 0 and 1. Q5 was on how the graphical no-
tations/tables of a given technique were easy to understand
by participants during the experiment. From the results
of Q5, we see that the notations/tables of FTA and FMEA
have received a strong agreement, whereas the notations and
tables of STPA received a neutral agreement. Q6 was on
how the procedure of a given technique was clear and well-
structured for participants. The results of Q6 show that
respondents agreed strongly with the clarity of the proce-
dure of FTA and moderately agreement with the procedure
of FMEA and STPA. The deviation in all responses was 1
or lower. Q7 was on whether the participants were never
confused when they used a given technique. Based on the
results of Q7, FTA received moderate disagreement. The
respondents mostly were neutral to STPA and moderately
positive towards FMEA. The deviation here was also small
(MAD: 1).
5.1.3 Ease Of Use (RQ3)
We asked participants five questions related to the ease of
use: Q8–Q12. Q8 was on how easy to perform the major
steps of a given technique were. The results of Q8 (Table 4)
show that FMEA and STPA received a moderate agreement,
whereas FTA received neutral responses. For all techniques,
the deviation was small with a MAD between 0 and 1. Q9
was on how easy it was to identify software safety require-
ments by a given technique. By Q9, the respondents mostly
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics of the Post-Experiment Questionnaire
Applicability Understandability Ease of Use
Technique Measure Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11 Q12
FTA Median 4 4 4 4 5 4 3 4 4 4 4 4
Mode 4 4 4 4 5 5 2 3 4 4 5 4
MAD 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Minimum 3 1 2 3 3 2 2 3 2 3 1 3
Maximum 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
FMEA Median 4 3 3 4 5 4 4 4 4 3 5 5
Mode 4 3 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 2 5 5
MAD 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0
Minimum 1 2 2 2 4 2 1 1 2 2 2 2
Maximum 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
STPA Median 5 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4
Mode 5 4 4 4 3 4 3 4 4 4 3 4
MAD 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
Minimum 2 3 3 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1
Maximum 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
agreed moderately with all techniques. The deviation here
was also lower with a MAD between 0 and 1. Q10 was how
easy to document the software safety requirements by the
notations/tables of a given technique. The results of Q10
reveal that the respondents agreed moderately with FTA
and STPA, whereas they disagreed moderately with FMEA.
The deviation of all techniques was 1 or lower. Q11 was on
how easy to draw the graphical notations/tables of a given
technique. By Q11, the respondents agreed strongly with
FTA and FMEA, whereas they were neutral with STPA.
The deviation again was small with a MAD between 0 and
1. Finally, Q12 was on how easy it was to learn a given
technique. The results of question Q12 show that the re-
spondents agreed strongly with FMEA and moderately with
FTA and STPA. The deviation in the answer was again low
between 0 and 1.
Based on the results in table 4, we computed the me-
dian of median of the related-questions values for the de-
pendent variables: applicability (Q1–Q3), understandability
(Q4–Q7) and ease of use (Q8–Q10) to achieve comparabil-
ity between the dependent variables. Table 5 shows the me-
dian of median results of the dependent variables for each
safety analysis technique. We do not observe any signifi-
cant differences between the three techniques regarding to
applicability, understandability and ease of use.
5.1.4 Effectiveness and Efficiency (RQ4–5)
We calculated the recall and coverage of each technique
based on the final report of each task. We also calculated
the time needed for each technique to measure the efficiency.
The effectiveness and efficiency were analysed for normality.
Table 6 shows the descriptive statistics (mean, median, std.
deviation) for the effectiveness and efficiency. The results
show that the recall score has a mean of 0.443 for STPA,
0.326 for FMEA and 0.231 for FTA. The same order exists
for the coverage score with a mean of 0.70 for STPA, 0.60
for FMEA and 0.30 for FTA. The results also reveal that
the time needed (in minutes) has a mean of 88 for FTA, 94
for FMEA and 116 for STPA.
5.2 Hypothesis Testing
We performed Two-Way ANOVA with Post-hoc to check
for statistically significant difference between the dependent
variables of FTA, FMEA and STPA. Table 7 shows the
ANOVA and Post-hoc tests results which we need for an-
swering the set hypotheses H1–H5.
For the hypotheses H1, the hypothesis test retains the
null hypotheses with p-values (p > 0.05): Hn11 and Hn13.
Therefore, there is no statistically significant difference be-
tween the applicability of STPA vs. FTA and FTA vs. FMEA.
However, the results reveal a statistical significant difference
between the applicability of STPA and FMEA by rejecting
the null hypothesis Hn12 with the p-value 0.003. Thus, we
accepted the alternative hypothesis Ha12.
Table 5: The Median of Median Results for Appli-
cability, Understandability and Ease of Use
Dependent Variable Method Median of Median
Applicability
FTA 4
FMEA 3
STPA 4
Understandability
FTA 4
FMEA 4
STPA 4
Ease of Use
FTA 4
FMEA 4
STPA 4
For the hypotheses H2 and H3, the hypothesis test reveals
that there is no statistically significant difference between
the ease of use and understandability of three techniques.
Therefore, the null hypotheses Hn21, Hn22, Hn23, Hn31,
Hn32, and Hn33 were retained with p-values (p > 0.05). For
the hypotheses H4, the difference between the effectiveness
of all three techniques was statistically significant. There-
fore, the null hypotheses Hn41, Hn42,Hn43 were rejected
with p-values (p < 0.05).
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics of Recall, Coverage
and Time needed
Factor Method Median Mean Std. Deviation
Recall
FTA 0.211 0.231 0.062
FMEA 0.316 0.326 0.033
STPA 0.455 0.443 0.038
Coverage
FTA 0.300 0.400 0.173
FMEA 0.600 0.633 0.153
STPA 0.700 0.700 0.100
Time
FTA 86 88 9.165
FMEA 93 94 4.58
STPA 115 116 4.04
For the hypotheses H5, the test reveals that the difference
between FTA and FMEA regarding efficiency was not sta-
tistically significant. Hence, the null hypothesis Hn53 was
retained with p-value (p > 0.05). Whereas the differences
between STPA vs. FTA, and STPA vs. FMEA were statis-
tically significant. Therefore, the null hypothesis Hn51 and
Hn52 were rejected with p-values (p < 0.05).
5.3 Discussion
Based on the results of the experiment presented in this
paper, we answered our research question as follows: For RQ
1, the results show that the applicability of STPA to identify
software safety requirements is better than the applicability
of FMEA. On the other hand, we could not see a signifi-
cant difference between the applicability of FTA vs. STPA
and FTA vs. FMEA. For RQ2 and RQ3, we can see in ta-
ble 7, there is no significant difference between FTA, FMEA
and STPA in the terms of understandability and ease of
use. That means the subjects perceived the understandabil-
ity and ease of use of all three techniques as similar.
To investigate RQ4, the results reveal that the subjects
obtained a higher level of effectiveness when using STPA
than FTA and FMEA. In particular, the average level of
effectiveness obtained by the subjects that used STPA is
12% higher than by the subjects that used FMEA and 21%
more than FTA. We also observed that the subjects achieved
a better effectiveness level when using FMEA than FTA. In
particular, FMEA outperformed FTA by 30% in terms of
coverage. In addition, the average level of effectiveness of
FMEA is 9% higher than FTA.
To answer RQ 5, the results show that FTA outperformed
FMEA and STPA in terms of efficiency. In fact, the sub-
jects applying FMEA needed 6 minutes more on average
than subjects applying FTA and the subject applying STPA
needed 28 minutes more on average than subjects applying
FTA. While the subjects applying STPA needed 22 min-
utes more on average than subjects applying FMEA. That
means the application of STPA requires more time by sub-
jects with little or no prior experience. The hypothesis test
confirms the descriptive statistical results in the tables 5 and
6. Figure 1 shows Tufte2charts of recall, coverage and time
needed. It can be seen that there is a difference in the recall,
coverage and time needed between three techniques.
2http://www.edwardtufte.com/
Table 7: Results of Hypothesis Test
Variable Method (i) Method (j) p-value
Applicability
FTA
FMEA 0.090
STPA 0.185
FMEA STPA 0.003
Understandability
FTA
FMEA 0.675
STPA 0.347
FMEA STPA 0.176
Ease of Use
FTA
FMEA 0.707
STPA 0.137
FMEA STPA 0.064
Effectiveness
FTA
FMEA 0.044
STPA 0.001
FMEA STPA 0.021
Efficiency
FTA
FMEA 0.292
STPA 0.002
FMEA STPA 0.006
5.4 Threats To Validity
This section presents the threats to validity of this study:
Construct validity One possible construct validity is that
the influence of the experimenter during the execution of
the experiment. To reduce the problems which relate to
this threat, we gave all relevant experiment materials and
instruction to the participants before conducting the exper-
iment. Furthermore, we tested our design with a pilot study
to improve the experiment procedure, task description and
the systems descriptions.
Internal validity The possible internal validity threat is
that there were learning effects over time and the exper-
iment tasks execution order. Regarding to these threats,
we assigned participants randomly to the groups in which
they can only apply one technique to one study object. An-
other internal threat is exchanging results and information
between groups. We asked the groups to avoid discussion of
their results with other groups. Moreover, our participants
were not aware of the hypotheses of the experiment. They
also were not evaluated on their performance.
External validity A possible external validity threat is that
our participants were students and they may not be repre-
sentative of professionals. We tried to have participants who
already have knowledge about safety-critical systems. Most
of our participants were master students who are not so far
from being junior industry system engineers. A low number
of participants can pose an external threat to generalise the
results.
6. CONCLUSION & FUTUREWORK
In this paper, we presented a controlled experiment aimed
at comparing three different safety analysis techniques: FTA,
FMEA and STPA with regard to their applicability, under-
standability, effectiveness and efficiency in terms of identify-
ing software safety requirements of safety-critical software.
We carried out the experiment with 21 graduate and un-
dergraduate students at the University of Stuttgart. The
subjects were trained in the safety analysis techniques dur-
ing tutorial sessions.
The results show that the subjects saw no difference be-
Figure 1: Tufte Charts of Recall, Coverage and Time needed
tween the applicability of FTA vs. FMEA and FTA vs.
STPA, whereas they found STPA is more applicable then
FMEA. In addition, the subjects experienced no significant
difference between the understandability and ease of use of
the three techniques. The results also show that STPA is
more effective than FTA and FMEA, whereas, FMEA is
more effective than FTA. Moreover, our results indicate that
the participants applying FTA and FMEA needed nearly the
same time. The participants applying FTA or FMEA needed
less time than the participants applying STPA. That means
FTA and FMEA seem to be more efficient than STPA.
We did not find any significant difference in the applicabil-
ity, understandability and ease of use of the three techniques.
However, STPA seems to be the most thorough method but
it also needs the most time. Yet, for safety-critical systems,
a high recall and coverage is probably more important.
As future work, we plan to conduct a qualitative and
quantitative empirical evaluation with safety analysis ex-
perts in industrial environments to improve the statistical
significance and external validity of the experiment.
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